Tag Archives: SRTP

Freeswitch PBX system

Setting up a in house hosted Enterprise PBX system for within enterprise communication .

Installation of Freeswitch on hosted server

source code

apt-get install git
git clone https://stash.freeswitch.org/scm/fs/freeswitch.git

verify installation by checking version

freeswitch -version
FreeSWITCH version: 1.9.0-742-8f1b7e0~64bit (-742-8f1b7e0 64bit)

post installation

optional arguments you can pass to freeswitch:
-nf — no forking
-reincarnate — restart the switch on an uncontrolled exit
-reincarnate-reexec — run execv on a restart (helpful for upgrades)
-u [user] — specify user to switch to
-g [group] — specify group to switch to
-core — dump cores
-help — this message
-version — print the version and exit
-rp — enable high(realtime) priority settings
-lp — enable low priority settings
-np — enable normal priority settings
-vg — run under valgrind
-nosql — disable internal sql scoreboard
-heavy-timer — Heavy Timer, possibly more accurate but at a cost
-nonat — disable auto nat detection
-nonatmap — disable auto nat port mapping
-nocal — disable clock calibration
-nort — disable clock clock_realtime
-stop — stop freeswitch
-nc — do not output to a console and background
-ncwait — do not output to a console and background but wait until the system is ready before exiting (implies -nc)
-c — output to a console and stay in the foreground

Options to control locations of files:
-base [basedir] — alternate prefix directory
-cfgname [filename] — alternate filename for FreeSWITCH main configuration file
-conf [confdir] — alternate directory for FreeSWITCH configuration files
-log [logdir] — alternate directory for logfiles
-run [rundir] — alternate directory for runtime files
-db [dbdir] — alternate directory for the internal database
-mod [moddir] — alternate directory for modules
-htdocs [htdocsdir] — alternate directory for htdocs
-scripts [scriptsdir] — alternate directory for scripts
-temp [directory] — alternate directory for temporary files
-grammar [directory] — alternate directory for grammar files
-certs [directory] — alternate directory for certificates
-recordings [directory] — alternate directory for recordings
-storage [directory] — alternate directory for voicemail storage
-cache [directory] — alternate directory for cache files
-sounds [directory] — alternate directory for sound files

Tracing SIP messages and Freeswitch processing for call from external user to internal user .Freeswitch acts as B2BUA

Receives incoming Call INVITE

recv 823 bytes from tcp/[caller_ip]:35365 at 09:55:07.936234:
   ------------------------------------------------------------------------
   INVITE sip:to_number@sometelco.com:5060 SIP/2.0
   Via: SIP/2.0/TCP 192.168.1.23:55934;branch=z9hG4bK-524287-1---cc11593581af6519;rport
   Max-Forwards: 70
   Contact: <sip:from_number@192.168.1.23:55934;transport=tcp&gt;
   To: <sip:to_number@sometelco.com:5060&gt;
   From: "from_number"<sip:from_number@sometelco.com:5060&gt;;tag=47a61272
   Call-ID: 94385YTY3ODNlNzE1YjE5MmY4NmQ3ZWUyZDAzM2E0YzBkM2I
   CSeq: 1 INVITE
   Allow: OPTIONS, SUBSCRIBE, NOTIFY, INVITE, ACK, CANCEL, BYE, REFER, INFO
   Content-Type: application/sdp
   Supported: replaces
   User-Agent: X-Lite release 5.4.0 stamp 94385
   Content-Length: 208

   v=0
   o=- 1553248503383592 1 IN IP4 192.168.1.23
   s=X-Lite release 5.4.0 stamp 94385
   c=IN IP4 192.168.1.23
   t=0 0
   m=audio 49874 RTP/AVP 8 101
   a=rtpmap:101 telephone-event/8000
   a=fmtp:101 0-15
   a=sendrecv
   ------------------------------------------------------------------------

checks with ACL for permission and set NAT. Isolate SDP for processing.

New Channel sofia/internal/from_number@sometelco.com:5060 [a8a2003f-5755-40fe-ab63-aab2f5264886]

Running State Change CS_NEW (Cur 1 Tot 274)
receiving invite from caller_ip:35365 version: 1.9.0 -742-8f1b7e0 64bit
IP caller_ip Approved by acl "domains[]". Access Granted.
Setting NAT mode based on nat.auto
Channel sofia/internal/from_number@sometelco.com:5060 entering state [received][100]
Remote SDP:
v=0
o=- 1553248503383592 1 IN IP4 192.168.1.23
s=X-Lite release 5.4.0 stamp 94385
c=IN IP4 192.168.1.23
t=0 0
m=audio 49874 RTP/AVP 8 101
a=rtpmap:101 telephone-event/8000
a=fmtp:101 0-15

mainatin and Updates call-state (switch_core_state_machine ) CS_NEW -> CS_INIT -> CS_ROUTING -> RINGING and send 100 trying to caller

State Change CS_NEW -&gt; CS_INIT
State NEW
Running State Change CS_INIT (Cur 1 Tot 274)
State INIT
SOFIA INIT
Standard INIT
State Change CS_INIT -&gt; CS_ROUTING
State INIT going to sleep
Running State Change CS_ROUTING (Cur 1 Tot 274)
Change DOWN -&gt; RINGING
State ROUTING
send 413 bytes to tcp/[caller_ip]:35365 at 09:55:07.937474:
   ------------------------------------------------------------------------
   SIP/2.0 100 Trying
   Via: SIP/2.0/TCP 192.168.1.23:55934;branch=z9hG4bK-524287-1---cc11593581af6519;rport=35365;received=caller_ip
   From: "from_number"<sip:from_number@sometelco.com:5060&gt;;tag=47a61272
   To: <sip:to_number@sometelco.com:5060&gt;
   Call-ID: 94385YTY3ODNlNzE1YjE5MmY4NmQ3ZWUyZDAzM2E0YzBkM2I
   CSeq: 1 INVITE
   User-Agent: FreeSWITCH-mod_sofia/1.9.0-742-8f1b7e0~64bit
   Content-Length: 0

   ------------------------------------------------------------------------

checks dialplan to route incoming call. In this case action is to bridge the incoming call to internal user

mod_sofia.c:154 sofia/internal/from_number@sometelco.com:5060 SOFIA ROUTING
switch_core_state_machine.c:236 sofia/internal/from_number@sometelco.com:5060 Standard ROUTING

mod_dialplan_xml.c:637 Processing from_number <from_number&gt;-&gt;to_number in context public
Dialplan: sofia/internal/from_number@sometelco.com:5060 parsing [public-&gt;dialplan_cutsom] continue=false
Dialplan: sofia/internal/from_number@sometelco.com:5060 Regex (PASS) [dialplan_cutsom] destination_number(to_number) =~ /^(\d+)$/ break=on-false
Dialplan: sofia/internal/from_number@sometelco.com:5060 Action log(INFO ***** Forwarding calls to gateway ****** ) 
Dialplan: sofia/internal/from_number@sometelco.com:5060 Action bridge({sip_auth_username=user,sip_auth_password=pass,sip_route_uri=sip:to_number@ip_addr;transport=tls,sip_invite_req_uri=sip:to_number@sometelco.com;transport=tls}sofia/external/to_number@ip_addr) 

update call state CS_ROUTING -> CS_EXECUTE

State Change CS_ROUTING -> CS_EXECUTE
State ROUTING going to sleep
Running State Change CS_EXECUTE (Cur 1 Tot 274)
State EXECUTE
SOFIA EXECUTE

set the crypto and codecs for the new call

switch_ivr_originate.c:2159 Parsing global variables
switch_channel.c:1104 New Channel sofia/external/to_number@ip_addr [cc1ae238-9efd-4f51-93e9-05abd48bea4d]
mod_sofia.c:5026 (sofia/external/to_number@ip_addr) State Change CS_NEW -> CS_INIT
switch_core_state_machine.c:584 (sofia/external/to_number@ip_addr) Running State Change CS_INIT (Cur 2 Tot 275)
switch_core_state_machine.c:627 (sofia/external/to_number@ip_addr) State INIT
mod_sofia.c:93 sofia/external/to_number@ip_addr SOFIA INIT
Set Local audio crypto Key [1 AEAD_AES_256_GCM_8 inline:ZbEHd76sP6FZSO9AYcqryybaA4HY3O5p2Uo+e1gmmfVaZCEic6cvKyArhMU]
Set Local video crypto Key [1 AEAD_AES_256_GCM_8 inline:Ehr3LoDR8Ur+wtNAMqoqIDn3S7V2inE2/n++awxS6/1P2ijcqfk12+LM/Pc]
Set Local text crypto Key [1 AEAD_AES_256_GCM_8 inline:NVSfjOmSS5BaP/5yqg+SOXcqvEFTHHrC8R5AYkkClXLuNOXYoaUYlrIWeW0]
Set Local audio crypto Key [2 AEAD_AES_128_GCM_8 inline:ePH/F2Qw5+zi8c7tkBb6Y2AQE5uevp+jWUkjgQ]
Set Local video crypto Key [2 AEAD_AES_128_GCM_8 inline:YWdfNLSx6MqG9WQ3TmsV/cSBDqjRUAbHE0rRCg]
Set Local text crypto Key [2 AEAD_AES_128_GCM_8 inline:DFXOP2V2Ep6FoHNz5HIMrm0cu6Za8I5wOI/hUw]
Set Local audio crypto Key [3 AES_CM_256_HMAC_SHA1_80 inline:SG5rYx3GSR2imutYQ+LzqHufG9UkG3n/SfmFHFOG/r75v2pwf2lG7Qpup+J0mw]
Set Local video crypto Key [3 AES_CM_256_HMAC_SHA1_80 inline:LkU3i9MD25k2wtTfSXUvhlxo66GtMWnXkKoxSdgRZyANoeOhufYnXzbXDo+7+w]
Set Local text crypto Key [3 AES_CM_256_HMAC_SHA1_80 inline:AUgUOVmFunzotvwZ6KuMDnBRR2XKk1DsX2qg465MsT6OAxHc2qKBFpeQEpxrqA]
Set Local audio crypto Key [4 AES_CM_192_HMAC_SHA1_80 inline:2PVBBJEp4QcTzTf4Th8Ag/7KiVPmrYb/FCowiRb6yAuTO/kxQLc]
Set Local video crypto Key [4 AES_CM_192_HMAC_SHA1_80 inline:OiFbZQ6mWuf5sHJT1pFPU6EWxEvQAO/0rcp8uGMf79k7RSR3IQA]
Set Local text crypto Key [4 AES_CM_192_HMAC_SHA1_80 inline:XyednWJmzRfsWQOgdhKaMeOeE/OLmnwo6hVEZWl4OJdKdgK6TVc]
Set Local audio crypto Key [5 AES_CM_128_HMAC_SHA1_80 inline:Yd4L5Qi7A/8xay5ZHWR1jKk9j5Kvy9s2Zo3NOES2]
Set Local video crypto Key [5 AES_CM_128_HMAC_SHA1_80 inline:ImgbbD6cnhnH19O1knP5SSIUULsZTaNJJIUepxt0]
Set Local text crypto Key [5 AES_CM_128_HMAC_SHA1_80 inline:V7+IbSZmTdQNjh/upUZ5TFDSlgarhDTVfV+AcUA+]
Set Local audio crypto Key [6 AES_CM_256_HMAC_SHA1_32 inline:JI+s9uFdZ3JfZmRRfwHr0OrpyZdtUXmMC0WRIZow1EuXRB9xKFRBk6KmSWomqQ]
Set Local video crypto Key [6 AES_CM_256_HMAC_SHA1_32 inline:MX6CGCrMEioUCJsIOCxRqlHOx4mUYRw4DslpY25njZQAkH6MgG/9hp7G8xr44A]
Set Local text crypto Key [6 AES_CM_256_HMAC_SHA1_32 inline:ikCz2sYLGoMO+dlrZj+znlQ3djAkGSYzSLLu6Az8u2THWPgnkFJXVgXSxHOaHw]
Set Local audio crypto Key [7 AES_CM_192_HMAC_SHA1_32 inline:5JzlrMywFZhHuNLWPG/HBrUi/Zcg414Q7ZfSaJQnUF5N9APy+GQ]
Set Local video crypto Key [7 AES_CM_192_HMAC_SHA1_32 inline:K0dZtwH1Q7AuSMBPPUesy047c4nAF+QuFsVvGdf3fYJDOD0Uwxo]
Set Local text crypto Key [7 AES_CM_192_HMAC_SHA1_32 inline:96SwyWAdV1a+BU3UbiX1PHdkRlSS4RtmwPWNPbCR3NDm1MyBh58]
Set Local audio crypto Key [8 AES_CM_128_HMAC_SHA1_32 inline:/RLYPhZs07WCCBRY8tWNTJemT/IFq1VPHGHmGvnG]
Set Local video crypto Key [8 AES_CM_128_HMAC_SHA1_32 inline:mQlgScFq1iMKEW8vobzwhmN9TWSmVblAv9u7c1/c]
Set Local text crypto Key [8 AES_CM_128_HMAC_SHA1_32 inline:WAQveMfrQkPBcfqH2qLmuzY63VLfT+N30/YLyuqE]
Set Local audio crypto Key [9 AES_CM_128_NULL_AUTH inline:f2fx2ekxPG3GTwTYARtquNJ87qO0Q5ei47KYlo9K]
Set Local video crypto Key [9 AES_CM_128_NULL_AUTH inline:qpAkfc1bWnZ0Y/1ql+dNvhIGgxxWZoVltnRD5kqn]
Set Local text crypto Key [9 AES_CM_128_NULL_AUTH inline:LyhSlzI3X38WKPwZ83035Ddvse4J/2KnKoydo2FD]

set proxy route and create SDP for sending invite to bridged client

sofia_glue.c:1268 sip:to_number@ip_addr;transport=tls Setting proxy route to sofia/external/to_number@ip_addr
sofia_glue.c:1299 sofia/external/to_number@ip_addr sending invite version: 1.9.0 -742-8f1b7e0 64bit
Local SDP:
v=0
o=FreeSWITCH 1553228435 1553228436 IN IP4 via_addr
s=FreeSWITCH
c=IN IP4 via_addr
t=0 0
m=audio 20072 RTP/SAVP 8 101
a=rtpmap:8 PCMA/8000
a=rtpmap:101 telephone-event/8000
a=fmtp:101 0-16
a=crypto:1 AEAD_AES_256_GCM_8 inline:ZbEHd76sP6FZSO9AYcqryybaA4HY3O5p2Uo+e1gmmfVaZCEic6cvKyArhMU
a=crypto:2 AEAD_AES_128_GCM_8 inline:ePH/F2Qw5+zi8c7tkBb6Y2AQE5uevp+jWUkjgQ
a=crypto:3 AES_CM_256_HMAC_SHA1_80 inline:SG5rYx3GSR2imutYQ+LzqHufG9UkG3n/SfmFHFOG/r75v2pwf2lG7Qpup+J0mw
a=crypto:4 AES_CM_192_HMAC_SHA1_80 inline:2PVBBJEp4QcTzTf4Th8Ag/7KiVPmrYb/FCowiRb6yAuTO/kxQLc
a=crypto:5 AES_CM_128_HMAC_SHA1_80 inline:Yd4L5Qi7A/8xay5ZHWR1jKk9j5Kvy9s2Zo3NOES2
a=crypto:6 AES_CM_256_HMAC_SHA1_32 inline:JI+s9uFdZ3JfZmRRfwHr0OrpyZdtUXmMC0WRIZow1EuXRB9xKFRBk6KmSWomqQ
a=crypto:7 AES_CM_192_HMAC_SHA1_32 inline:5JzlrMywFZhHuNLWPG/HBrUi/Zcg414Q7ZfSaJQnUF5N9APy+GQ
a=crypto:8 AES_CM_128_HMAC_SHA1_32 inline:/RLYPhZs07WCCBRY8tWNTJemT/IFq1VPHGHmGvnG
a=crypto:9 AES_CM_128_NULL_AUTH inline:f2fx2ekxPG3GTwTYARtquNJ87qO0Q5ei47KYlo9K
a=ptime:20
a=sendrecv
m=audio 20072 RTP/AVP 8 101
a=rtpmap:8 PCMA/8000
a=rtpmap:101 telephone-event/8000
a=fmtp:101 0-16
a=ptime:20
a=sendrecv

attach the SDP to INVITE and proceed forwarding INVITE to callee

send 1988 bytes to tls/[ip_addr]:5061 at 09:55:07.939831:
   ------------------------------------------------------------------------
   INVITE sip:to_number@sometelco.com;transport=tls SIP/2.0
   Via: SIP/2.0/TLS via_addr:5080;rport;branch=z9hG4bK21Qm9U3eHX0Nc
   Max-Forwards: 69
   From: "from_number" <sip:from_number@via_addr&gt;;tag=8jByBXa2pF1Fj
   To: <sip:to_number@ip_addr&gt;
   Call-ID: 6a827514-c72b-1237-8aab-02a933b32da0
   CSeq: 2070461 INVITE
   Contact: <sip:mod_sofia@via_addr:5080&gt;
   User-Agent: FreeSWITCH-mod_sofia/1.9.0-742-8f1b7e0~64bit
   Allow: INVITE, ACK, BYE, CANCEL, OPTIONS, MESSAGE, INFO, UPDATE, REGISTER, REFER, NOTIFY
   Supported: timer, path, replaces
   Allow-Events: talk, hold, conference, refer
   Content-Type: application/sdp
   Content-Disposition: session
   Content-Length: 1162
   X-FS-Support: update_display,send_info
   Remote-Party-ID: "from_number" <sip:from_number@via_addr&gt;;party=calling;screen=yes;privacy=off

   v=0
   o=FreeSWITCH 1553228435 1553228436 IN IP4 via_addr
   s=FreeSWITCH
   c=IN IP4 via_addr
   t=0 0
   m=audio 20072 RTP/SAVP 8 101
   a=rtpmap:8 PCMA/8000
   a=rtpmap:101 telephone-event/8000
   a=fmtp:101 0-16
   a=crypto:1 AEAD_AES_256_GCM_8 inline:ZbEHd76sP6FZSO9AYcqryybaA4HY3O5p2Uo+e1gmmfVaZCEic6cvKyArhMU
   a=crypto:2 AEAD_AES_128_GCM_8 inline:ePH/F2Qw5+zi8c7tkBb6Y2AQE5uevp+jWUkjgQ
   a=crypto:3 AES_CM_256_HMAC_SHA1_80 inline:SG5rYx3GSR2imutYQ+LzqHufG9UkG3n/SfmFHFOG/r75v2pwf2lG7Qpup+J0mw
   a=crypto:4 AES_CM_192_HMAC_SHA1_80 inline:2PVBBJEp4QcTzTf4Th8Ag/7KiVPmrYb/FCowiRb6yAuTO/kxQLc
   a=crypto:5 AES_CM_128_HMAC_SHA1_80 inline:Yd4L5Qi7A/8xay5ZHWR1jKk9j5Kvy9s2Zo3NOES2
   a=crypto:6 AES_CM_256_HMAC_SHA1_32 inline:JI+s9uFdZ3JfZmRRfwHr0OrpyZdtUXmMC0WRIZow1EuXRB9xKFRBk6KmSWomqQ
   a=crypto:7 AES_CM_192_HMAC_SHA1_32 inline:5JzlrMywFZhHuNLWPG/HBrUi/Zcg414Q7ZfSaJQnUF5N9APy+GQ
   a=crypto:8 AES_CM_128_HMAC_SHA1_32 inline:/RLYPhZs07WCCBRY8tWNTJemT/IFq1VPHGHmGvnG
   a=crypto:9 AES_CM_128_NULL_AUTH inline:f2fx2ekxPG3GTwTYARtquNJ87qO0Q5ei47KYlo9K
   a=ptime:20
   m=audio 20072 RTP/AVP 8 101
   a=rtpmap:8 PCMA/8000
   a=rtpmap:101 telephone-event/8000
   a=fmtp:101 0-16
   a=ptime:20
   ------------------------------------------------------------------------

manage and update call state for this call leg too CS_INIT -> CS_ROUTING -> CS_CONSUME_MEDIA

Standard INIT
State Change CS_INIT -&gt; CS_ROUTING
State INIT going to sleep
Running State Change CS_ROUTING (Cur 2 Tot 275)
Channel sofia/external/to_number@ip_addr entering state [calling][0]
State ROUTING
SOFIA ROUTING
State Change CS_ROUTING -&gt; CS_CONSUME_MEDIA
State ROUTING going to sleep
Running State Change CS_CONSUME_MEDIA (Cur 2 Tot 275)
State CONSUME_MEDIA
State CONSUME_MEDIA going to sleep
recv 365 bytes from tls/[ip_addr]:5061 at 09:55:07.940977:
   ------------------------------------------------------------------------
   SIP/2.0 100 trying -- your call is important to us
   Via: SIP/2.0/TLS via_addr:5080;rport=59774;branch=z9hG4bK21Qm9U3eHX0Nc;received=via_addr
   From: "from_number" <sip:from_number@via_addr&gt;;tag=8jByBXa2pF1Fj
   To: <sip:to_number@ip_addr&gt;
   Call-ID: 6a827514-c72b-1237-8aab-02a933b32da0
   CSeq: 2070461 INVITE
   Server: ZenTrunk
   Content-Length: 0

   ------------------------------------------------------------------------

Callee from PBX throws auth challenge

recv 483 bytes from tls/[ip_addr]:5061 at 09:55:08.046934:
   ------------------------------------------------------------------------
   SIP/2.0 407 Proxy Authentication Required
   Via: SIP/2.0/TLS via_addr:5080;received=via_addr;rport=59774;branch=z9hG4bK21Qm9U3eHX0Nc
   From: "from_number" <sip:from_number@via_addr&gt;;tag=8jByBXa2pF1Fj
   To: <sip:to_number@ip_addr&gt;;tag=f1cff938000510c1d9006e5a2a4e240b-5736
   Call-ID: 6a827514-c72b-1237-8aab-02a933b32da0
   CSeq: 2070461 INVITE
   Proxy-Authenticate: Digest realm="domain.com", nonce="XJSyI1yUsPf0w1bAocvH4IOCayfWt3bX", qop="auth"
   Content-Length: 0

   ------------------------------------------------------------------------
send 387 bytes to tls/[ip_addr]:5061 at 09:55:08.047056:
   ------------------------------------------------------------------------
   ACK sip:to_number@sometelco.com;transport=tls SIP/2.0
   Via: SIP/2.0/TLS via_addr:5080;rport;branch=z9hG4bK21Qm9U3eHX0Nc
   Max-Forwards: 69
   From: "from_number" <sip:from_number@via_addr&gt;;tag=8jByBXa2pF1Fj
   To: <sip:to_number@ip_addr&gt;;tag=f1cff938000510c1d9006e5a2a4e240b-5736
   Call-ID: 6a827514-c72b-1237-8aab-02a933b32da0
   CSeq: 2070461 ACK
   Content-Length: 0

   ------------------------------------------------------------------------

calleer sends re-invit with auth details

Authenticating 'altanai' with 'Digest:"doamin.com":altanai:pass'.
send 2273 bytes to tls/[ip_addr]:5061 at 09:55:08.047387:
   ------------------------------------------------------------------------
   INVITE sip:to_number@sometelco.com;transport=tls SIP/2.0
   Via: SIP/2.0/TLS via_addr:5080;rport;branch=z9hG4bK3aHDBQmje6p8Q
   Max-Forwards: 69
   From: "from_number" <sip:from_number@via_addr&gt;;tag=8jByBXa2pF1Fj
   To: <sip:to_number@ip_addr&gt;
   Call-ID: 6a827514-c72b-1237-8aab-02a933b32da0
   CSeq: 2070462 INVITE
   Contact: <sip:mod_sofia@via_addr:5080&gt;
   User-Agent: FreeSWITCH-mod_sofia/1.9.0-742-8f1b7e0~64bit
   Allow: INVITE, ACK, BYE, CANCEL, OPTIONS, MESSAGE, INFO, UPDATE, REGISTER, REFER, NOTIFY
   Supported: timer, path, replaces
   Allow-Events: talk, hold, conference, refer
   Proxy-Authorization: Digest username="altanai", realm="domain.com", nonce="XJSyI1yUsPf0w1bAocvH4IOCayfWt3bX", cnonce="apLWcMcrEjerigKpM7MtoA", algorithm=MD5, uri="sip:to_number@sometelco.com;transport=tls", response="0044b00a4d5026252b32eed619d70f9d", qop=auth, nc=00000001
   Content-Type: application/sdp
   Content-Disposition: session
   Content-Length: 1162
   X-FS-Support: update_display,send_info
   Remote-Party-ID: "from_number" <sip:from_number@via_addr&gt;;party=calling;screen=yes;privacy=off

   v=0
   o=FreeSWITCH 1553228435 1553228436 IN IP4 via_addr
   s=FreeSWITCH
   c=IN IP4 via_addr
   t=0 0
   m=audio 20072 RTP/SAVP 8 101
   a=rtpmap:8 PCMA/8000
   a=rtpmap:101 telephone-event/8000
   a=fmtp:101 0-16
   a=crypto:1 AEAD_AES_256_GCM_8 inline:ZbEHd76sP6FZSO9AYcqryybaA4HY3O5p2Uo+e1gmmfVaZCEic6cvKyArhMU
   a=crypto:2 AEAD_AES_128_GCM_8 inline:ePH/F2Qw5+zi8c7tkBb6Y2AQE5uevp+jWUkjgQ
   a=crypto:3 AES_CM_256_HMAC_SHA1_80 inline:SG5rYx3GSR2imutYQ+LzqHufG9UkG3n/SfmFHFOG/r75v2pwf2lG7Qpup+J0mw
   a=crypto:4 AES_CM_192_HMAC_SHA1_80 inline:2PVBBJEp4QcTzTf4Th8Ag/7KiVPmrYb/FCowiRb6yAuTO/kxQLc
   a=crypto:5 AES_CM_128_HMAC_SHA1_80 inline:Yd4L5Qi7A/8xay5ZHWR1jKk9j5Kvy9s2Zo3NOES2
   a=crypto:6 AES_CM_256_HMAC_SHA1_32 inline:JI+s9uFdZ3JfZmRRfwHr0OrpyZdtUXmMC0WRIZow1EuXRB9xKFRBk6KmSWomqQ
   a=crypto:7 AES_CM_192_HMAC_SHA1_32 inline:5JzlrMywFZhHuNLWPG/HBrUi/Zcg414Q7ZfSaJQnUF5N9APy+GQ
   a=crypto:8 AES_CM_128_HMAC_SHA1_32 inline:/RLYPhZs07WCCBRY8tWNTJemT/IFq1VPHGHmGvnG
   a=crypto:9 AES_CM_128_NULL_AUTH inline:f2fx2ekxPG3GTwTYARtquNJ87qO0Q5ei47KYlo9K
   a=ptime:20
   m=audio 20072 RTP/AVP 8 101
   a=rtpmap:8 PCMA/8000
   a=rtpmap:101 telephone-event/8000
   a=fmtp:101 0-16
   a=ptime:20
   ------------------------------------------------------------------------
2019-03-22 09:55:08.041945 [DEBUG] sofia.c:7291 Channel sofia/external/to_number@ip_addr entering state [calling][0]
recv 365 bytes from tls/[ip_addr]:5061 at 09:55:08.048255:
   ------------------------------------------------------------------------
   SIP/2.0 100 trying -- your call is important to us
   Via: SIP/2.0/TLS via_addr:5080;rport=59774;branch=z9hG4bK3aHDBQmje6p8Q;received=via_addr
   From: "from_number" <sip:from_number@via_addr&gt;;tag=8jByBXa2pF1Fj
   To: <sip:to_number@ip_addr&gt;
   Call-ID: 6a827514-c72b-1237-8aab-02a933b32da0
   CSeq: 2070462 INVITE
   Server: ZenTrunk
   Content-Length: 0

   ------------------------------------------------------------------------

Call is accepted by callee , 200 OK is received by Freeswitch PBX

recv 1451 bytes from tls/[ip_addr]:5061 at 09:55:14.223460:
   ------------------------------------------------------------------------
   SIP/2.0 200 OK
   Via: SIP/2.0/TLS via_addr:5080;received=via_addr;rport=59774;branch=z9hG4bK3aHDBQmje6p8Q
   Record-Route: <sip:3.92.18.95:5060;lr;ftag=8jByBXa2pF1Fj&gt;
   Record-Route: <sip:18.205.1.67;lr;ftag=8jByBXa2pF1Fj;did=fd.0971&gt;
   Record-Route: <sip:ip_addr:5060;r2=on;lr;ftag=8jByBXa2pF1Fj;nat=yes&gt;
   Record-Route: <sip:ip_addr:5061;transport=tls;r2=on;lr;ftag=8jByBXa2pF1Fj;nat=yes&gt;
   From: "from_number" <sip:from_number@via_addr&gt;;tag=8jByBXa2pF1Fj
   To: <sip:to_number@ip_addr&gt;;tag=D0r5K6pp80Ujm
   Call-ID: 6a827514-c72b-1237-8aab-02a933b32da0
   CSeq: 2070462 INVITE
   Contact: <sip:to_number@34.201.27.78:5080;transport=udp&gt;
   User-Agent: FreeSWITCH-mod_sofia/1.9.0-742-8f1b7e0~64bit
   Allow: INVITE, ACK, BYE, CANCEL, OPTIONS, MESSAGE, INFO, UPDATE, REGISTER, REFER, NOTIFY
   Supported: timer, path, replaces
   Allow-Events: talk, hold, conference, refer
   Content-Type: application/sdp
   Content-Disposition: session
   Content-Length: 380
   Remote-Party-ID: "to_number" <sip:to_number@34.201.27.78&gt;;party=calling;privacy=off;screen=no

   v=0
   o=FreeSWITCH 1553215954 1553215955 IN IP4 18.212.123.47
   s=FreeSWITCH
   c=IN IP4 18.212.123.47
   t=0 0
   m=audio 33516 RTP/SAVP 8 101
   a=rtpmap:8 PCMA/8000
   a=rtpmap:101 telephone-event/8000
   a=fmtp:101 0-16
   a=sendrecv
   a=crypto:3 AES_CM_256_HMAC_SHA1_80 inline:/itE1k5BLMoTNzo7YEv6hCyM6R6wyHem3Coc5jjYVlKR2L3tEzBG5zx1QHgVSg==
   a=ptime:20
   m=audio 0 RTP/SAVP 19
   a=rtpmap:19 
   ------------------------------------------------------------------------

send ACK to callee

Update Callee ID to "to_number" <to_number&gt;
Channel sofia/external/to_number@ip_addr entering state [completing][200]
sofia.c:7301 Remote SDP:
v=0
o=FreeSWITCH 1553215954 1553215955 IN IP4 18.212.123.47
s=FreeSWITCH
c=IN IP4 18.212.123.47
t=0 0
m=audio 33516 RTP/SAVP 8 101
a=rtpmap:8 PCMA/8000
a=rtpmap:101 telephone-event/8000
a=fmtp:101 0-16
a=crypto:3 AES_CM_256_HMAC_SHA1_80 inline:/itE1k5BLMoTNzo7YEv6hCyM6R6wyHem3Coc5jjYVlKR2L3tEzBG5zx1QHgVSg==
a=ptime:20
m=audio 0 RTP/SAVP 19

send 953 bytes to tls/[ip_addr]:5061 at 09:55:14.224320:
   ------------------------------------------------------------------------
   ACK sip:to_number@34.201.27.78:5080;transport=udp SIP/2.0
   Via: SIP/2.0/TLS via_addr:5080;rport;branch=z9hG4bK4Ka6cj5NBFDUK
   Route: <sip:ip_addr:5061;transport=tls;r2=on;lr;ftag=8jByBXa2pF1Fj;nat=yes&gt;
   Route: <sip:ip_addr:5060;r2=on;lr;ftag=8jByBXa2pF1Fj;nat=yes&gt;
   Route: <sip:18.205.1.67;lr;ftag=8jByBXa2pF1Fj;did=fd.0971&gt;
   Route: <sip:3.92.18.95:5060;lr;ftag=8jByBXa2pF1Fj&gt;
   Max-Forwards: 70
   From: "from_number" <sip:from_number@via_addr&gt;;tag=8jByBXa2pF1Fj
   To: <sip:to_number@ip_addr&gt;;tag=D0r5K6pp80Ujm
   Call-ID: 6a827514-c72b-1237-8aab-02a933b32da0
   CSeq: 2070462 ACK
   Contact: <sip:mod_sofia@via_addr:5080&gt;
   Proxy-Authorization: Digest username="altanai", realm="domain.com", nonce="XJSyI1yUsPf0w1bAocvH4IOCayfWt3bX", cnonce="apLWcMcrEjerigKpM7MtoA", algorithm=MD5, uri="sip:to_number@sometelco.com;transport=tls", response="0044b00a4d5026252b32eed619d70f9d", qop=auth, nc=00000001
   Content-Length: 0

   ------------------------------------------------------------------------

set audio codecs, update call state CS_CONSUME_MEDIA -> CS_EXCHANGE_MEDIA

entering state [ready][200]
looking for crypto suite [AEAD_AES_256_GCM_8] in [3 AES_CM_256_HMAC_SHA1_80 inline:/itE1k5BLMoTNzo7YEv6hCyM6R6wyHem3Coc5jjYVlKR2L3tEzBG5zx1QHgVSg==]
looking for crypto suite [AEAD_AES_128_GCM_8] in [3 AES_CM_256_HMAC_SHA1_80 inline:/itE1k5BLMoTNzo7YEv6hCyM6R6wyHem3Coc5jjYVlKR2L3tEzBG5zx1QHgVSg==]
looking for crypto suite [AES_CM_256_HMAC_SHA1_80] in [3 AES_CM_256_HMAC_SHA1_80 inline:/itE1k5BLMoTNzo7YEv6hCyM6R6wyHem3Coc5jjYVlKR2L3tEzBG5zx1QHgVSg==]
Found suite AES_CM_256_HMAC_SHA1_80
Set Remote Key [3 AES_CM_256_HMAC_SHA1_80 inline:/itE1k5BLMoTNzo7YEv6hCyM6R6wyHem3Coc5jjYVlKR2L3tEzBG5zx1QHgVSg==]
Audio Codec Compare [PCMA:8:8000:20:64000:1]/[PCMA:8:8000:20:64000:1]
Audio Codec Compare [PCMA:8:8000:20:64000:1] ++++ is saved as a match
Set telephone-event payload to 101@8000
Set Codec sofia/external/to_number@ip_addr PCMA/8000 20 ms 160 samples 64000 bits 1 channels
sofia/external/to_number@ip_addr Original read codec set to PCMA:8
Set telephone-event payload to 101@8000
sofia/external/to_number@ip_addr Set 2833 dtmf send payload to 101 recv payload to 101
AUDIO RTP [sofia/external/to_number@ip_addr] 10.130.74.15 port 20072 -> 18.212.123.47 port 33516 codec: 8 ms: 20
Starting timer [soft] 160 bytes per 20ms
Set 2833 dtmf send payload to 101
Set 2833 dtmf receive payload to 101
Set rtp dtmf delay to 40
Activating audio Secure RTP SEND
srtp:sdes:AES_CM_256_HMAC_SHA1_80
Activating audio Secure RTP RECV
srtp:sdes:AES_CM_256_HMAC_SHA1_80
has been answered
Callstate Change DOWN -> ACTIVE
Audio Codec Compare [PCMA:8:8000:20:64000:1]/[PCMU:0:8000:20:64000:1]
Audio Codec Compare [PCMA:8:8000:20:64000:1]/[PCMA:8:8000:20:64000:1]
Audio Codec Compare [PCMA:8:8000:20:64000:1] ++++ is saved as a match
Set telephone-event payload to 101@8000
Set Codec sofia/internal/from_number@sometelco.com:5060 PCMA/8000 20 ms 160 samples 64000 bits 1 channels
sofia/internal/from_number@sometelco.com:5060 Original read codec set to PCMA:8
Set telephone-event payload to 101@8000
sofia/internal/from_number@sometelco.com:5060 Set 2833 dtmf send payload to 101 recv payload to 101
AUDIO RTP [sofia/internal/from_number@sometelco.com:5060] 10.130.74.15 port 29426 -> 192.168.1.23 port 49874 codec: 8 ms: 20
Starting timer [soft] 160 bytes per 20ms
Set 2833 dtmf send payload to 101
Set 2833 dtmf receive payload to 101
Set rtp dtmf delay to 40

send early media/ RTP to Callee

 Pre-Answer sofia/internal/from_number@sometelco.com:5060!
 Callstate Change RINGING -> EARLY
 2019-03-22 09:55:14.221933 [DEBUG] switch_core_media.c:8147 Audio params are unchanged for sofia/internal/from_number@sometelco.com:5060.
 2019-03-22 09:55:14.221933 [DEBUG] mod_sofia.c:881 Local SDP sofia/internal/from_number@sometelco.com:5060:
 v=0
 o=FreeSWITCH 1553219088 1553219089 IN IP4 via_addr
 s=FreeSWITCH
 c=IN IP4 via_addr
 t=0 0
 m=audio 29426 RTP/AVP 8 101
 a=rtpmap:8 PCMA/8000
 a=rtpmap:101 telephone-event/8000
 a=fmtp:101 0-16
 a=ptime:20
 a=sendrecv
Pre-Answer sofia/internal/from_number@sometelco.com:5060!
Callstate Change RINGING -&gt; EARLY
2019-03-22 09:55:14.221933 [DEBUG] switch_core_media.c:8147 Audio params are unchanged for sofia/internal/from_number@sometelco.com:5060.
2019-03-22 09:55:14.221933 [DEBUG] mod_sofia.c:881 Local SDP sofia/internal/from_number@sometelco.com:5060:
v=0
o=FreeSWITCH 1553219088 1553219089 IN IP4 via_addr
s=FreeSWITCH
c=IN IP4 via_addr
t=0 0
m=audio 29426 RTP/AVP 8 101
a=rtpmap:8 PCMA/8000
a=rtpmap:101 telephone-event/8000
a=fmtp:101 0-16
a=ptime:20
a=sendrecv

send 1254 bytes to tcp/[caller_ip]:35365 at 09:55:14.232934:
   ------------------------------------------------------------------------
   SIP/2.0 200 OK
   Via: SIP/2.0/TCP 192.168.1.23:55934;branch=z9hG4bK-524287-1---cc11593581af6519;rport=35365;received=caller_ip
   From: "from_number"<sip:from_number@sometelco.com:5060&gt;;tag=47a61272
   To: <sip:to_number@sometelco.com:5060&gt;;tag=NjvKFKQaHp52e
   Call-ID: 94385YTY3ODNlNzE1YjE5MmY4NmQ3ZWUyZDAzM2E0YzBkM2I
   CSeq: 1 INVITE
   Contact: <sip:to_number@via_addr:5060;transport=tcp&gt;
   User-Agent: FreeSWITCH-mod_sofia/1.9.0-742-8f1b7e0~64bit
   Accept: application/sdp
   Allow: INVITE, ACK, BYE, CANCEL, OPTIONS, MESSAGE, INFO, UPDATE, REGISTER, REFER, NOTIFY, PUBLISH, SUBSCRIBE
   Supported: timer, path, replaces
   Allow-Events: talk, hold, conference, presence, as-feature-event, dialog, line-seize, call-info, sla, include-session-description, presence.winfo, message-summary, refer
   Session-Expires: 120;refresher=uas
   Content-Type: application/sdp
   Content-Disposition: session
   Content-Length: 220
   Remote-Party-ID: "to_number" <sip:to_number@sometelco.com&gt;;party=calling;privacy=off;screen=no

   v=0
   o=FreeSWITCH 1553219088 1553219089 IN IP4 via_addr
   s=FreeSWITCH
   c=IN IP4 via_addr
   t=0 0
   m=audio 29426 RTP/AVP 8 101
   a=rtpmap:8 PCMA/8000
   a=rtpmap:101 telephone-event/8000
   a=fmtp:101 0-16
   a=ptime:20
   ------------------------------------------------------------------------
entering state [completed][200]
Channel [sofia/internal/from_number@sometelco.com:5060] has been answered
Callstate Change EARLY -&gt; ACTIVE
Originate Resulted in Success: [sofia/external/to_number@ip_addr]
State Change CS_CONSUME_MEDIA -&gt; CS_EXCHANGE_MEDIA
Running State Change CS_EXCHANGE_MEDIA (Cur 2 Tot 275)
State EXCHANGE_MEDIA
SOFIA EXCHANGE_MEDIA
recv 507 bytes from tcp/[caller_ip]:35365 at 09:55:14.459247:
   ------------------------------------------------------------------------
   ACK sip:to_number@via_addr:5060;transport=tcp SIP/2.0
   Via: SIP/2.0/TCP 192.168.1.23:55934;branch=z9hG4bK-524287-1---104aee5ed0b7ca66;rport
   Max-Forwards: 70
   Contact: <sip:from_number@192.168.1.23:55934;transport=tcp&gt;
   To: <sip:to_number@sometelco.com:5060&gt;;tag=NjvKFKQaHp52e
   From: "from_number"<sip:from_number@sometelco.com:5060&gt;;tag=47a61272
   Call-ID: 94385YTY3ODNlNzE1YjE5MmY4NmQ3ZWUyZDAzM2E0YzBkM2I
   CSeq: 1 ACK
   User-Agent: X-Lite release 5.4.0 stamp 94385
   Content-Length: 0

   ------------------------------------------------------------------------
Advertisements

WebRTC Security

Unlike most conventional  real-time systems (e.g., SIP-based soft phones) WebRTC communications  are directly controlled by a Web server over some signalling protocol which may be XMPP , websockets , socket.io , Ajax etc . This poses new  challenges such as

  • Web browser might expose a JavaScript APIs which allows  web server to place a video call itself.This may cause web pages to secretly record and stream the webcam activity from user’s computer
  • malicious calling services can record the user’s conversation and misuse
  • malicious webpages can lure users via advertising and execute auto calling services .
  • Since JavaScript calling APIs are implemented as browser built-ins , un authorized access to these can also make user’s audio and camera streams vulnerable
  • If program and APIs allow the server to instruct the browser to send arbitrary content, then they can be used to bypass firewalls or mount denial of service attacks.

WEB ATTACKERS are who induce users to visit their sites but do not control the network.NETWORK ATTACKERS are who are able to control network. When analyzing HTTP connections, we must assume that traffic is going to the attacker.

security WebRTC

The Browser Threat Model

The browser acts as a TRUSTED COMPUTING BASE (TCB) both from the user’s perspective and to some extent from the  server’s.  HTML and JavaScript (JS) provided by the web server can execute scripts on browser and generate actions and events . However browser  operates in a sandbox that isolates these scripts both from the user’s computer and from server .

 

Access to Local Resources

The users computer may have lot of private and confidential data on the disk . Browser do make it mandatory that user must explicitly select the file and consent to its upload before doing file upload and transfer transactions . However still it is not very rare that misleading text and buttons can make users click files .  

Another way of accessing local resources is through downloading malicious files to users computer which are executable and may harm users computer .

 

SOP or Same Origin Policy

SOP  forces scripts from each site to run in their own, isolated, sandboxes.  It enables webpages and scripts from the same origin server to interact with each other’s JS variables, but prevents pages from the different origins or even iframes on the same page to not exchange information.

As part of SOP scripts are allowed to make HTTP requests via the  XMLHttpRequest() API to only those server which have same ORIGIN/domain as that of the originator .

 

CORS [Cross-Origin Resource Sharing ]

CORS enables multiple web services to intercommunicate . Therefore when a script from origin A executes what would otherwise be a forbidden cross-origin request, the browser instead contacts the target server B to determine whether it is willing to allow cross-origin requests from A.  If it is so willing, the browser then allows the request.  This consent verification process is designed to safely allow cross-origin requests.

 

Websockets

Even websockets overcome SOP and establish cross origin transport channels .

Once a WebSockets connection has been established from a script to a site, the script can exchange any traffic it likes without being required to frame it as a series of HTTP request/response transactions.

WebSockets use masking technique to randomize the bits that are being transmitted , thus making it more difficult to generate traffic which resembles a given protocol , thus making it difficult for inspection from flowing traffic .

 

JSONP

Jsonp is a hack designed to bypass origin restriction through script tag injection. A JSONp enabled server passes the response in user specified function

when we use <script> tags the domain limitation is ignored ie we can load scripts from any domain .  So when we need to fetch get exchange data just pass callback parameters through scripts . For example


function mycallback(data){
// this is the callback function executed when script returns 
alert("hi"+ data);</span>
}

var script = document.createElement('script');
script.src = '//serverb.com/v1/getdata?callback=mycallback'
document.head.appendChild(script) 

 

There have been found vulnerabilities in the existing Java and Flash consent verification techniques and handshake.

The Security arising from ICE and TURN

ICE

Sender and receiver are able to share media stream after a offer answer handshake. But we already need one in order to do NAT hole-punching. Presuming the ICE server is malicious , in absence of transaction IDs by stun unknow to call scripts , it is not possible for the webpage of receiver to ascertain is the data is forged or original . Thus to prevent this the browser must generate hidden transaction Id’s and should not sharing with call scripts ,even via a diagnostic interface.

 

IP Location Privacy

As soon as the callee sends their ICE candidates, the caller learns the callee’s IP addresses.  The callee’s server reflexive address reveals a lot of information about the callee’s location.

To prevent server should suppress the start of ICE negotiation until the callee has answered.

Also user may hide their location entirely by forcing all traffic through a TURN server.

Communications Security

Goal of webrtc based call services should be to create channel which is secure  against both message recovery and message modification for all audio / video and data .

Threats from Screen Sharing

With the increasing requirement of screen sharing in web app and communication systems there is always a high threat of oversharing / exposing confidential passwords , pins , security details etc . This may either through some part of screen or some notification whihc pops up .

There is always the case when the user may believe he is sharing a window when in fact they are the entire desktop.

The attacker may request screensharing and make user open his webmail , payment settings or even net-banking accounts .

 

Long term access to camera and microphone

When user frequently uses a site he / she may want to give the site a long-term access to the camera and microphone ( indicated by ” Always allow on this site ” in chrome ). However the site may be hacked and thus initiate call on users’ computer automatically to secretly listen-in .

 

False UI shows cut off call while still being active

Unless the user checks his laptops glowing camera light LED or goes and monitors the traffic himself he would not know if there is active call in background, which according to him he had cut off . In such a case an attacker may pretend to cut a call shows red phone signs and supportive text but still keep the session and media stream active placing himself on mute .

 

During-Call Attack

Even if the calling service cannot directly access keying material ,it  can simply mount a man-in-the-middle attack on the connection. The idea is to mount a bridge capturing all the traffic.

To protect against this it is now mandatory to use https for using getusermedia and otherwise also recommended to keep webrtc comm services on https or use strict fingerprinting .
This section is derived from Security Considerations for WebRTC draft-ietf-rtcweb-security-08


 

How can I make my WebRTC solution secure?

In one of my previous posts I have mentioned about Security threats to WebRTC Solution . It includes mainly 4 ways in which WebRTC Solution Providers and Users are vulnerable . It includes

  1. Identity Management ,
  2. Browser Security ,
  3. Authentication and
  4. Media encryption.

Since I have already covered these topics here( https://altanaitelecom.wordpress.com/2014/10/03/security-for-webrtc-applications/ ) I will not repeat the same here. This post is about making WebRTC secure so that they can be used inn area which require sensitive data to be communicated and need to be secure enough to withstand and hacks and attacks.

In the recent months everyone has been trying to get into the WebRTC  space but at the same time fearing that hackers might be able to listen in on conferences, access user data, or even private networks. Although development and usage around WebRTC is so simple , the security and encryption aspects of it are in the dim light.

So does existing WebRTC model offer security ?

We know that the forces behind WebRTC standardization are WHATWG, W3C, IETF and strong internet working groups . WebRTC security was already taken into consideration when standards were being build for it . The encryption methods and technologies like DTLS and SRTP were included to safeguard users from intrusions so that the information stays protected.

WebRTC media stack has native built-in features that address security concerns. The peer-to-peer media is already encrypted for privacy . Figure below:

WebRTC media stack Solution Architecture - Google Slides (1)

WebRTC media stack

For WebRTC to transfer real time data, the data is first encrypted using the DTLS (Datagram Transport Layer Security) method. This is a protocol built into all the WebRTC supported browsers from the start (Chrome, Firefox and Opera). On a DTLS encrypted connection, eavesdropping and information tampering cannot take place.

Other than DTLS, WebRTC also encrypts video and audio data via the SRTP (Secure Real-Time Protocol) method ensuring that IP communications – your voice and video traffic – can not be heard or seen by unauthorized parties.

What is SRTP ?

The Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (or SRTP) defines a profile of RTP (Real-time Transport Protocol), intended to provide encryption, message authentication and integrity, and replay protection to the RTP data in both unicast and multicast applications.

Earlier models of VOIP communication such as SIP based calls had an option to use only RTP for communication thereby subjecting the endpoint users to lot of problem like compromising media Confidentiality  . However the WebRTC model mandates the use of SRTP hence ruling out insecurities of RTP completely. For encryption and decryption of the data flow SRTP utilizes the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) as the default cipher.

What is DTLS ?

DTLS allows datagram-based applications to communicate in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, or message forgery. The DTLS protocol is based on the stream-oriented Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol .

Together DTLS and SRTP enables the exchange of the cryptographic parameters so that the key exchange takes place in the media plane and are multiplexed on the same ports as the media itself without the need to reveal crypto keys in the SDP.

Today the browser acts as a TRUSTED COMPUTING BASE (TCB) where the HTML and JS act inside of a sandbox that isolates them both from the user’s computer.

A script cannot access user’s webcam , microphone , location , file , desktop capture without user’s explicit consent. When the user allows access, a red dot will appear on that tab, providing a clear indication to the user, that the tab has media access.

Figure depicting browser asking for user’s consent to access Media devices for WebRTC .

Untitled drawing

Figure depicting Media Capture active on browser with red dot .

Untitled drawing (1)
we know that XMLHttpRequest() API can be used to secretly send data from one origin to other and this can be used to secretly send information without user’s knowledge . However now , SAME ORIGIN POLICY (SOP) in browser’s prevents server A from mounting attacks on server B via the user’s browser, which protects both the user (e.g., from misuse of his credentials) and the server B (e.g., from DoS attack).

 

In-spite of all this ,  the security challenges with Web Server based WebRTC service are many for example :

  1. If the both the peers have WebRTC browser then one can place a WebRTC call to callee anytime this might result in denial of service .
  2. Since the media is p2p and also can override firewalls settings through TURN server , it can result in unwanted data being send to peer .
  3. One may secretly make calls to users through website and extract information .
  4. Threat from screen sharing, for example user might mistakenly share his internet banking screen or some confidential information.
  5. Giving long-term access to the camera and microphone for certain sites is also a concern . for example : since next time you visit a site that has access to your microphone and camera , they can secretly be viewing youe webcam and microphone inputs .
  6. Clever use of User Interface to mask a ongoing call can mislead the user into believing that call has been cut while it is secretly still ongoing.
  7. Network attackers can modify an HTTP connection through my Wifi router or hotspot to inject an IFRAME (or a redirect) and then forge the response to initiate a call to himself.
  8. As WebRTC doesn’t yet have an congestion control mechanism , it can eat up a large chunk of user’s bandwidth.
  9. By visiting chrome://webrtc-internals/ in chrome browser alone , one can view the full traces of all webRTC communication happening through his browser . The traces contain all kinds of details like signalling server used , relay servers , TURN servers , peer IP , frame rates etc .

 

WebRTC Internals

Ofcourse other challenges that arrive with any other webservice based architecture are also applicable here such as :

  1. Malicious Websites which automatically execute the attacker’s scripts.
  2. User can be induced to download harmful executable files and run them.
  3. Improper use of W3C Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) to bypass SAME ORIGIN POLICY (SOP) .

Best practices to make your VOIP Solution more secure

A simple WebRTC architecture is shown in the figure below :

WebRTC media stack Solution Architecture - Google Slides (2)

By following the simple steps described below one can ensure a more secure WebRTC implementation . The same applies to healthcare and banking firms looking forth to use WebRTC as a communication solution for their portals .

1. Ensure that the signalling platform is over a secure protocol such as SIP / HTTPS / WSS .

2. User’s that can participate in a call , should be pre registered / Authenticated with a registrar service. Unauthenticated entities should be kept away from session’s reach .

WebRTC authentication certificate

WebRTC authentication certificate

2. Make sure that ICE values are masked thereby not rendering the caller/ callee’s IP and location to each other through tracing in chrome://webrtc-internals/ or packet detection in Wirehsark on user’s end.

3. Also since media is p2p , the media contents like audio video channel are between peers directly in full duplex. Thus

4. As the signalling server maintains the number of peers , it should be consistently monitored for addition of suspicious peers in a call session. If the number of peers actually present on signalling server is more that the number of peers interacting on WebRTC page then it means that someone is eavesdropping secretly and should be terminated from session access by force.

5. It is observed these days that users simply agree to all permissions request from browser without actually consciously giving consent . Therefore user’s should be made aware of API in websites which ask for undue permissions . For example permission to :

Screenshot from 2015-04-22 15:22:15

6. To protect against Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attack the media path should be monitored regularly for no suspicious relay.

7. Third party API should be thoroughly verified before sending their data on WebRTC DataChannel.

8. Before Desktop Sharing user’s should be properly notified and advised to close any screen containing sensitive information .

 

What happens if your VOIP solution is on the verge of being compromised ?

As the media connections are p2p , even if we restart the signalling server , it will not affect the ongoing media sessions . Only the time duration ( probably 3 – 4 minutes ) it takes to restart the server , is when the users will not be able to connect to signalling server for creating new sessions .

Most browsers today like Google Chrome and Mozilla Firefox have a goof record of auto-updating themselves withing 24 hours of a vulnerability of threat occurring .

If a call is confirmed to be compromised , it should be within the power of Web Application server rendering the WebRTC capable page to cut off the call .

References :

Proxying Media Streams via Kamailio’s RTP Proxy

Kamailio is a SIP server which does not play any role by itself in media transmission path. this behaviour leads to media packets having to attempt to stream peer to peer between caller and callee which in turn many a times causes them to get dropped in absence of NAT management

To ensure that media stream is proxied via an RTP proxy kamailio can use RTP proxy module combined with a RTP proxy.

This setup also provides other benefits such as controlling media media , security , Load balancing between many rtp proxies ,bridge signalling between multiple network interfaces etc.

RTP Proxy module

Used to proxy the media stream .

RTP proxies that can be used along with this module are:

RTP proxies can be used for bridging network interfaces , load distribution and balancing etc.It does not support transcoding.

Parameters :

rtpproxy_sock – binds a ip and port for rtp proxy

 modparam("rtpproxy", "rtpproxy_sock", "udp:localhost:12221")

rtpproxy_disable_tout – when rtp proxy is disabled then timeout till when it doesnt connect

rtpproxy_tout – timeout to wait for reply

rtpproxy_retr – num of retries after timeout

nortpproxy_str – sets the SDP attribute used by rtpproxy to mark the message’s SDP attachment with information that it have already been changed. Default value is

“a=nortpproxy:yes\r\n”

and others like

“a=sdpmangled:yes\r\n”

timeout_socket (string)

ice_candidate_priority_avp (string)

extra_id_pv (string)

db_url (string)

table_name (string)

rtp_inst_pvar (string)

Functions

set_rtp_proxy_set(setid) – Sets the Id of the rtpproxy set to be used for the next unforce_rtp_proxy(), rtpproxy_offer(), rtpproxy_answer() or rtpproxy_manage() command

rtpproxy_offer([flags [, ip_address]]) – to make the media pass through RTP the SDP is altered. Value of flag can be
1 – append first Via branch to Call-ID when sending command to rtpproxy.
2 – append second Via branch to Call-ID when sending command to rtpproxy. See flag ‘1’ for its meaning.
3 – behave like flag 1 is set for a request and like flag 2 is set for a reply
a – flags that UA from which message is received doesn’t support symmetric RTP. (automatically sets the ‘r’ flag)
b – append branch specific variable to Call-ID when sending command to rtpproxy
l – force “lookup”, that is, only rewrite SDP when corresponding session already exists in the RTP proxy
i, e – direction of the SIP message when rtpproxy is running in bridge mode. ‘i’ is internal network (LAN), ‘e’ is external network (WAN). Values ie , ei , ee and ii
x – shortcut for using the “ie” or “ei”-flags, to do automatic bridging between IPv4 on the “internal network” and IPv6 on the “external network”. Differentiated by IP type in the SDP, e.g. a IPv4 Address will always call “ie” to the RTPProxy (IPv4(i) to IPv6(e)) and an IPv6Address will always call “ei” to the RTPProxy (IPv6(e) to IPv4(i))
f – instructs rtpproxy to ignore marks inserted by another rtpproxy in transit to indicate that the session is already gone through another proxy. Allows creating a chain of proxies
r – IP address in SDP should be trusted. Without this flag, rtpproxy ignores address in the SDP and uses source address of the SIP message as media address which is passed to the RTP proxy
o – flags that IP from the origin description (o=) should be also changed.
c – flags to change the session-level SDP connection (c=) IP if media-description also includes connection information.
w – flags that for the UA from which message is received, support symmetric RTP must be forced.
zNN – perform re-packetization of RTP traffic coming from the UA which has sent the current message to increase or decrease payload size per each RTP packet forwarded if possible. The NN is the target payload size in ms, for the most codecs its value should be in 10ms increments, however for some codecs the increment could differ (e.g. 30ms for GSM or 20ms for G.723).
ip_address denotes the address of new SDP

such as : rtpproxy_offer(“FRWOC+PS”) is
rtpengine_offer(“force trust-address symmetric replace-origin replace-session-connection ICE=force RTP/SAVPF”);

route { 
... 
if (is_method("INVITE")) 
{ 
    if (has_body("application/sdp")) 
    { 
        if (rtpproxy_offer()) t_on_reply("1"); 
    } else { 
        t_on_reply("2"); 
    } 
} 

if (is_method("ACK") && has_body("application/sdp")) rtpproxy_answer(); 
... 
} 
onreply_route[1] { 
   if (has_body("application/sdp")) rtpproxy_answer(); 
} 
onreply_route[2] { 
   if (has_body("application/sdp")) rtpproxy_offer(); 
} 

rtpproxy_answer([flags [, ip_address]])- rewrite SDP to proxy media , it can be used from REQUEST_ROUTE, ONREPLY_ROUTE, FAILURE_ROUTE, BRANCH_ROUTE.

rtpproxy_destroy([flags]) – tears down RTP proxy session for current call. Flags are ,
1 – append first Via branch to Call-ID
2 – append second Via branch to Call-ID
b – append branch specific variable to Call-ID
t – do not include To tag to “delete” command to rtpproxy thus causing full call to be deleted

unforce_rtp_proxy()

rtpproxy_manage([flags [, ip_address]]) – Functionality is to use predfined logic for handling requests
If INVITE with SDP, then do rtpproxy_offer()
If INVITE with SDP, when the tm module is loaded, mark transaction with internal flag FL_SDP_BODY to know that the 1xx and 2xx are for rtpproxy_answer()
If ACK with SDP, then do rtpproxy_answer()
If BYE or CANCEL, or called within a FAILURE_ROUTE[], then call unforce_rtpproxy().
If reply to INVITE with code >= 300 do unforce_rtpproxy()
If reply with SDP to INVITE having code 1xx and 2xx, then do rtpproxy_answer() if the request had SDP or tm is not loaded, otherwise do rtpproxy_offer()
This function can be used from ANY_ROUTE.

rtpproxy_stream2uac(prompt_name, count) – stream prompt/announcement pre-encoded with the makeann command. The uac/uas suffix selects who will hear the announcement relatively to the current transaction – UAC or UAS. Also used for music on hold (MOH).
Params : prompt_name – path name of the prompt to stream
count – number of times the prompt should be repeated. When count is -1, the streaming will be in loop indefinitely until the appropriate rtpproxy_stop_stream2xxx is issued.
Example rtpproxy_stream2xxx usage

if (is_method("INVITE")) { 
rtpproxy_offer();
if (is_audio_on_hold()) {
rtpproxy_stream2uas("/var/rtpproxy/prompts/music_on_hold", "-1");
} else {
rtpproxy_stop_stream2uas();
};
};

rtpproxy_stream2uas(prompt_name, count)

rtpproxy_stop_stream2uac()- Stop streaming of announcement/prompt/MOH

rtpproxy_stop_stream2uas()

start_recording()

Exported Pseudo Variables

$rtpstat

RPC Commands

rtpproxy.enable
rtpproxy.list

Ref : https://kamailio.org/docs/modules/5.3.x/modules/rtpproxy.html